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Abstract
The dynamic allocation of resources for the supply of Information Services and Information
Products (ISIP) is of increasing importance for infrastructure and service providers in
growing B2B and B2C markets. Based on the FIPA oriented Multi Agent System (MAS)
platform JADE we developed a model which simulates the allocation of ISIP resources by a
Combinatorial Auction (CA). An Improved Greedy CA-Algorithm (IG-CAA) and a Simulated
Annealing based CA-Algorithm (SA-CAA) are proposed to solve the resulting winner
determination problem. Using the bid price for task processing as a control variable has
turned out to be an efficient tool even in non-economic settings.  Performing multiple
simulation runs, we could show the superiority of the SA-CAA to the IG-SAA for a test
scenario consisting of unstructured bids. However we failed to demonstrate, that the SA-CAA
is capable to handle a satisfying ISIP resource allocation in distributed systems with
affordable computational expense and could only recommend the IG-CAA for this purpose,
due to its lower calculation requirements.
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1. Price Controlled Resource Allocation for the Provision
    of Information Products and Services
The optimal allocation of resources is traditionally a fundamental topic of production process
design and implementation. Scarcity of resources dominating the optimization of these
processes is normally expressed by prices, which can act as a control variable in this context.
The paper presented here, is first of all dealing with price-controlled automated resource
allocation for the provision of Information Services and Information Products (ISIP), which
seems to be of increasing interest for infrastructure and service providers in growing B2B and
B2C markets. The simultaneous usage of network and computing capacity to enable web-
based  video  conference  and telecommunication  applications  between corporations  is a n
example for ISIP  related  B2B  tasks, which can be  handled  by  price-controlled  resource
allocation. In B2C markets the provision and accounting of video-on-demand has similar
application properties. The transfer of considerable amounts of data being collected during
daily business activities in large corporations, exploiting  times of  low  infrastructure  load,
could be seen as a further  instance of  an IT problem, where optimal  automated resource
allocation  is valuable.  All these applications have the need for simultaneous usage of
different resources at specific times. Booking of the required capacities employing priced
allocation requests therefore seems to be reasonable in this context.
A common approach to solve the optimal allocation of priced resources is the use of Yield
Management (YM) methods, first introduced to maximize seat capacity revenue in the airline
industry by Belobaba (1989). Recently the YM-approach is deployed increasingly to handle
resource allocation in distributed IT infrastructure systems, e.g. in telecom industries (Humair
2001). Besides YM-methods relying on refined Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques studied
in Schwind and Wendt (2002) the application of Combinatorial Auctions ( CAs) for price
controlled resource allocation turns out to be a valuable approach. One advantage of the
application of CAs for resource allocation, initially motivated by Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin
(1982) for time slot allocation in airport management, is the ability to express
complementarities and substitutionalities between the required goods and resources which are
involved into the production process. Other examples for goods and resources which are of
current interest for CA allocation, showing synergies with respect to the bidder’s utility
function, are network resources (Brewer 1999), material and tasks in a supply chain (Walsh,
Wellman &  Ygge 2000) or licenses for satellite-TV and mobile-communication airwave
bands (Milgrom 1998).
2. A Scheduling Scenario for ISIP-Provision Employing
    Combinatorial Auctions
We now depict a scenario, for the creation and provision of ISIP, where computing power,
volatile computer memory, non-volatile storage capacity  and  data transfer bandwidth
represent four essential factors (RS1 to RS4) of a production function. As can be seen in
figure 1 the bids for the ten ISIP tasks (A to J) which require the resources of four essential
factors are submitted as a schedule divided into ten equidistant time slots (t1…t10). These
requested time slots are only valuable as a bundle. Each of the tasks A to J (represented by
agents bids) has a fixed demand of resources expressed in units of the factors specified at
position 2 to 5 in a task definition tupel T (p, rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4) and a willingness to pay for the
whole bundle denoted as bid price p.Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
Figure 1: 10 ISIP tasks to be scheduled on four machines using CAs. The first
number p in the tasks descriptions T (p, rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4) denotes the willingness to
pay, the remaining four qualify the factor requirements for the production function.
2.1 Submitting Unstructured Bids
To provide a realistic simulation scenario, we increased the amount of time slots in the
preceding scenario to 24, with respect to a 24 hour production schedule. In addition bidders
are allowed to submit bids, which have different capacity requests for each resource type in a
bid bundle. The whole bid bundle is submitted as a resource allocation matrix, which can be
seen in figure 2. The maximum resource capacity load per time slot each agent can bid for is
defined by the system variable bidderMaxLoad (Rmax). The mean density of the bids in the
bid bundle matrix is determined by a probability factor pTM, denoted as bidDensity.  The
demand price for the bid bundle matrix is fixed by multiplying the accumulated resource
allocation by a random factor between 0 and 1:  setBundlePrice =
1+pricePerRes*cumulatedLoad.
Figure 2: Unstructured Bid Bundle
2.2 Submitting Structured Bids
Until now bids for resources were scattered randomly over time slots. This seems not to be
very realistic in terms of an ISIP scheduling scenario. Therefore we divided the 24 hour
RS 1
RS 4
RS 2
RS 3
A(9,1,2,4,1)
B(2,0,2,1,1)
C(8,5,2,4,0)
D(4,1,2,0,2)
E(5,1,2,4,1)
F(5,1,0,3,3)
G(8,1,2,4,4)
H(3,1,2,0,0)
I(9,1,2,4,5)
 J(5,0,2,4,1)
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production schedule into four 6-hour shifts. For each shift a task with a length between 1 to m
= 5 (equally distributed pTL = (1+2+3+4+5)/5 * 1/6) is chosen applying a constant probability
p TS. The beginning of the task is positioned randomly on the shift’s time slots according to
its length (task must not overlap). The resulting mean probability for the occupancy of a time
slot is pTM = pTS * pTL ￿ pTS = pTM / p TL. To achieve a mean time slot occupancy probability
pTM (usually 1/3 in our settings) which is equal to the probability used in the unstructured
bidding process, task allocation probability in a 6-hour shift has to be pTS = (1/3) / (3 * 1/6) =
2/3.
Figure 3: Structured Bid Bundle
3. Combinatorial Auction Problem
Performing CAs in our resource and task allocation context means that a bidder submits his
bid-bundles including several items, which are needed for ISIP production in a specific
quantity at a particular time. The valuation of the items (resources) for the bidder depends on
the completeness of the acquired bundle. Omitting some of the items, leads to a non-
proportional lower valuation of the bid-bundle because the bidders ISIP process will be
disturbed by the lack of resources yielding lower earnings. Such complementarity effects in
connection with the contrary  substitutionality effect generate nonlinearities
1 making the
Combinatorial Allocation Problem (CAP) NP-complete to solve for the auctioneer
(Fujishima, Leyton-Brown & Shoham 1999 and de Vries & Vohra 2001).
A formal description of the winner determination problem for the CAP is given by:
Set of bidders: N
Set of items: M
Item of set M: m
Subset (Bundle): S
Bid of Agent j: b j(S)
Maximum bid for bundle S: b(S)
max  ￿
￿ M S
S x S b ) (
subject to
                                                
1 The substitutionality effect is interdependent to the subadditivity of the single item utility-function: v(A) + v(B) > v(A+B), the
  complementary effect depends on the superadditivity of the bidders utility-function: v(A) + v(B) < v(A+B)Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
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Searching an optimal or at least a near optimal solution for the CAP, we can categorize three
main approaches: deterministic procedures, heuristic approaches and equilibrium methods.
3.1 Deterministic Procedures
Tackling with the computational complexity of CAs, early approaches (Rassenti et al. 1982)
simply tried to express the CAP, which is an instance of the Set Partitioning Problem (SPP),
as a LP-formulation by the relaxation of the generic Integer Programming (IP) approach
(Chandru & Rao 1998 and Andersson, Tenhunen & Ygge 2000). That means a bid can be
expressed as fraction, changing the second CAP-constraint into xs‡0, " S￿M. Optimality is
not longer guaranteed for the LP relaxation, except for some special cases described by Nisan
(1999). Forcing bidders to submit their bids in a particular structure, these special cases can
be achieved. Another way to attain exact solutions of the CAP is to use B&B (Branch-and-
Bound) search procedures in junction with LP relaxation, using the result of a LP calculation
as upper bound for the branch decision in a search tree. Sandholm (1999) and Sandholm,
Suri,  Gilpin and Levine (2001)  present a depth-first B&B algorithm called CABOB
(Combinatorial Auction Branch On Bids) which employs structured graphs (bidtrees) for bid
representation to enhance search efficiency and shows good performance especially for a
sparse populated search space. Further  Sandholm (2000) presents an advanced search
technique using bidtree representations in a modified A*-algorithm
2.
A different method to solve the CAP exactly is to refine simple search strategies which
normally lead to full enumeration. Fujishima et al. (1999) present a CA Structured Search
(CASS) that enhances a simple depth-first search strategy by the reduction of the search
space.
Similar to full enumeration strategies, a Dynamic Programming approach proposed by
Rothkopf and 
bidtrees enabling the algorithm to solve the CAP in reasonable time. The disadvantage of this
procedure lies in its applicability to only a few bidders and in its strong bid structure
constraints.
3.2 Heuristic Approaches
A common way to deal with NP-hard problems like the CAP is to accept a trade-off between
solution quality and calculation effort, using heuristic approaches. The simplest heuristic
approach to find a CAP solution is a Greedy procedure. Mostly the Greedy CA-Algorithm
(GR-CAA) consists of two steps:
•  According to a revenue oriented criteria (e.g. avg. price per bid-bundle, single-item resp.)
submitted bids are sorted in a list.
•  CA allocation is build simply by adding ordered bids from the list as far as they don’t
contradict to bids which are already attributed.
The allocation quality achieved with the GR-CAA normally depends on the sorting criteria
and the bidder’s utility-function.
                                                
2 In addition Sandholm (2000) introduces an extension of this algorithm, the so called Iterative-Deepening-A* (IDA*).Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
Many approaches combine Greedy allocation with sophisticated methods. Hoos and Boutilier
(2000) present a stochastic search algorithm (CASANOVA), which substitutes bids sorted by
revenue per bid in a Greedy allocation, controlled by stochastic exchange probabilities,
having the objective to increase allocation revenue. Exchange probabilities are modified by
time factors denoting the age of the bid in the current allocation, guaranteeing the attainment
of a stable final state.
Other CAP solution methods employ Greedy strategies in connection with deterministic
procedures. Calculating an optimal allocation using a dual LP formulation which yields the
shadow prices
3 of the allocated goods is a first step in a procedure proposed by Nisan (1999).
Ordering the bids descending by using the ratio of bid bundle price and shadow prices of the
single items is the second step. The final allocation in  Nisan’s Greedy algorithm is then
achieved by making these bids winners, which do not comprise a good that has already been
allocated by higher bids in the second step. A second version combines this Greedy algorithm
with a B&B procedure to decide which bids have to be replaced to improve the current
allocation.
Easwaran and Pitt (2000) employ a Genetic Algorithm (GA) that matches tasks to service
providers in a CAP setting. They encode services, providers and task attribution on a
chromosome each minimizing matching costs. By applying genetic operators, performing
selection and subsequent replication they achieve a better allocation performance than a
modified depth-first search algorithm. For this purpose they use a GA fitness function, based
on selection criteria, which are defined for the required properties (bandwidth, server
capacity, e.g.).
Collins,  Tsvetovat,  Mobasher and  Gini (1998) present a MAS setting, called MAGNET
(Multi AGent NEgotiation  Testbed), where agents negotiate contracts for task allocation
based on temporal and precedence constraints. One approach to solve the underlying CAP is
a Simulated Annealing (SA) procedure (Collins,  Gini &  Mobasher 2002). Allocations are
represented as bid-task mappings stored in the nodes of a queue. The queue is sorted
according to the value of the nodes, which is determined by factors task coverage, feasibility
and cost of the represented allocation. Randomly a node is picked from the queue, using a
higher probability for the leading nodes. The chosen node is expanded by an open bid. The
modified node then is inserted into the queue, according to its calculated value. The
probability for the selection of nodes at the tail of the queue is decreased corresponding to an
annealing temperature. Compared with an IP-solution (Collins & Gini 2001) the SA does not
perform significantly better
4.
3.3 Equilibrium Methods
So far we only considered one-shot auctions, collecting all bids and processing the CA at a
specific time. The introduction of Simultaneous Iterative Auctions (SIA), where bidders can
bid simultaneously in multiple rounds, offers the possibility to reduce the complexity of the
CAP by using an iterative equilibrium attainment process. This is based on the fact that an
allocation which is formed in one round has not to be optimal in the Pareto-efficiency sense,
because bidders can reevaluate the allocation attributed by the auctioneer in the previous
round and formulate appropriate bids for the next round.
                                                
3 The shadow price can be considered as the price of an added item, which is the upper bound on how much that
  item will actually contribute to revenue.
4 In addition Collins, Demir and Gini (2002) provide an IDA* algorithm derived from Sandholm (2000) to solve their task
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SIA’s problem is its tendency to invite bidders for strategic bidding behavior, e.g., an agent
could exaggerate its willingness to pay to deter other bidders from further bidding already in
the first round and then is able submit a lower offer in the second round, corresponding to its
true willingness to pay. One way to avoid this behavior is to apply the  Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (Vickrey 1963 and Clarke 1971 and Groves 1973) mechanism, which charges the
social-cost caused by the bids to each agent.
Varian and MacKie-Mason (1994) therefore proposed a Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA)
procedure as an extension of the classic sealed bid, second price Vickrey Auction. The GVA
calculates the utility maximizing allocation, subject to the resource constraints, using the
utility function reported by the bidders (which can deviate from true utility function), with
and without bidder i. The bidder i then is charged with the costs of welfare-loss caused by his
participation in the auction process by calculating the price for a received bid bundle. Varian
(1995) shows that this mechanism makes truth revelation a dominant strategy.
Many SIA designs claim to be incentive compatible if GVA is implemented in the auction
protocol, however the most authors don’t use VCG mechanism in practice.
One example for a SIA design is the Virtual Simultaneous Auction (VSA) proposed by
Fujishima et al. (1999) where each bid is represented by a virtual bidder who bids for the
non-allocated bid-bundles while the auctioneer adjusts the prices for the single items in every
round until an optimal allocation is reached.
With iBundle, Parkes (1999) presents a SIA, where bidders can submit their bids as OR and
XOR-formulations. In an iterative auction a provisional allocation is calculated. The process
is similar to the VSA; bids are accepted with respect to a minimum price, allocation
feasibility and consistency to the bid XOR-formulation. Prices of goods are increased in each
round and as long as bidders submit higher bids, the auction will be continued
5.
Wellman (1993) employs a Walrasian Tâtonnement Process on distributed markets (a market
with an auctioneer for each good) to solve a task allocation problem. At first glance, the
auction deviates from the classic CA structure because interdependencies in bids are not
explicitly considered. However, after some modifications, the WALRAS algorithm (Wellman
& Cheng 1995), which reaches an equilibrium solution by asynchronously adjusting prices to
supply and demand on the decentralized goods markets in multiple rounds, is able to solve a
CAP in a task dependency network for supply chain formation (Wellman, MacKie-Mason,
Walsh & Wurman 2001)
6.
4. Design of two Heuristic CA-Algorithms
4.1 Improved Greedy CA-Algorithm
Based on considerations in 3.2, we now propose an Improved-Greedy CA-Algorithm (IG-
CAA) for ISIP resource bundle allocation. The assumptions made in the ISIP scheduling
scenario (chapter 2) are the fundamentals for the IG-CAA application setting. The IG-CAA
implementation (see figure 4) is using a ratio of constraint violation and bundle price to sort
the bids. In contrast to the procedure outlined in 3.2, IG-CAA combines all bids in one
aggregation-matrix ( lines 1-6) and then removes the bids causing a constraint violation
                                                
5 The plain iBundle process is not GVA compatible resulting from the English auction character of the mechanism (Parkes 2001).
6 In a recent approach Walsh et al. (2000) turns back to the application of classic CAs to solve the decentralized scheduling problem.Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
according to the sorting criteria (lines 7-19). Finally the algorithm tries to refit the rejected
bids to increase the price-allocation ratio of the aggregation-matrix (lines 20-35).
1 begin
2 foreach  bidder b do
3 bid := selectHighestBidFromAgent(b)
4 addBidToMatrix( matrix, bid)
5 acceptedBids.add( bid)
6 end
7 init value := 0
8 while not testMatrix( utilizationMatrix) do
9 foreach acceptedBid bid
10 reduction := getReduction( matrix, bid)
11 if ( testValue := reduction / bid_price) > value
12 remove := bid
13 value := testValue
14 endif
15 accepted.remove( remove)
16 removeBidFromMatrix( matrix, remove)
17 end
18 end
19 do
20 init addedBid := false
21 foreach rejectedBids bid
22 addBidToMatrix( matrix, bid)
23 if testMatrix( matrix) and bid_price > selectedBid_price
24 selectedBid := bid
25 endif
26 removeBidFromMatrix( matrix, bid)
27 end
28 if selectedBid != null
29 acceptedBids.add( selectedBid)
30 rejectedBids.remove( selectedBid)
31 addBidToMatrix( utilizationMatrix, selectedBid)
32 addedBid := true
33 endif
34 while addedBid == true
35 end
FMER
GEFORMATigure 4: Improved Greedy CA-Algorithm
4.2 Simulated Annealing CA-Algorithm
The stochastic exchange mechanism for the allocation improvement of the greedy strategy,
implemented in the IG-CAA, is not very promising without an intelligent control mechanism.
One way to enhance the efficiency of stochastic search is to employ SA to control the
exchange probabilities of the improvement process. The SA-algorithm presented here is
strongly related to the original proposal (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt & Vecchi 1983), using a penalty
cost function to valuate the fitness of an allocation and a temperature factor to control
exchange probabilities in the annealing process.
The Simulated-Annealing CA-Algorithm (SA-CAA) (see figure 5) proceeds as follows:
The initial allocation of the SA-CAA contains each bid with the probability of its occurrence
in a solution generated by a random walk. Starting with this aggregation matrix, theSchwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
auctioneer tries to add a new bid submitted by an agent who wouldn’t receive any
acceptance for one of his bids yet (line 19). The resulting allocation is evaluated according
to the fitness function which consists of the difference between income and penalty costs
(line 16). Penalty costs are calculated by multiplying the exceeding resource capacity of the
new allocation by a penalty factor. The probability for the acceptance of the new solution
Pacc is determined by employing the Metropolis probability ( Metropolis, N,  Rosenbluth,
AW, Rosenbluth, MN, Teller, AH, Teller, E  1953), which depends on the progress in
allocation fitness, expressed by an energy difference D E, and the annealing temperature T:
￿
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The same mechanism is implemented for the removal of a bid (line 19). At each iteration the
program chooses one of these iterations with equal probability (line 16).
1 begin
2 initialize temperature
3 initialize penaltyFactor
4 fitMemory := income – penaltyCost
5 initialize coolingFactor
6 initialize testInterval
7 s := 0
8 do
9 s := s + 1
10 if s % testInterval = = 0
11 if income – penaltyCost > fitMemory
12 temperature := temperature * coolingFactor
13 endif
14 fitMemory := income – penaltyCost
15 endif
16 if random(0,1) < 0.5
17 testAddBid( temperature, penaltyFactor);
18 else
19 testRemoveBid( temperature, penaltyFactor);
20 endif
21 while temperature > 0.1
22 end
MERGEFORMATFigure 5: Simulated Annealing CA-Algorithm
A crucial problem of SA-mechanisms is based on the fact that the starting temperature and
cooling rate are essential for performance. Optimizing these parameters manually seems to be
unpromising. Therefore we decided to employ a temperature control technique proposed by
Sundermann and  Lemahieu (1995).  They determine the starting temperature so that the
algorithm accepts about 80% of exchange operations leading to a deterioration of the fitness
function:
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The annealing process is executed in stages awaiting the occurrence of a thermodynamic
equilibrium indicated by a steady state of the energy difference DE.  Temperature between
successive annealing stages is decreased by a cooling factor a=0.99 (line 12), which has
turned out to be a suitable rule of thumb. In general the annealing process is stopped if theSchwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
energy difference DE does not change significantly after the temperature decrease between
stages. We choose a stopping temperature of 0.1 die to the fact that energy decrease couldn’t
be observed at higher levels.
5. Implementation of the CA-Multi Agent System
The implementation of our CA simulation scenario is based on the FIPA
7 conform JAVA
MAS platform JADE
8. Each bidder and the auctioneer are represented as single software
agents. Agents can be located on distributed computer hosts in JADE, enabling the
transferability of the whole setting into a B2B or B2C environment without excessive effort
(Poggio & Bergenti 2001).
Figure 6: FIPA conform AUML sequence diagram of the IG-CAA and SG-CAA
A critical point in MAS is usually communication design. Even auctions generate a non-
negligible communication overhead between agents. We designed communication acts
according to the FIPA Agent Communication Language (ACL) definition
9. A helpful
approach in this context is to deploy the communication structure by designing an FIPA
Agent-UML (AUML) sequence diagram
10 (figure 6) (Bergenti & Poggio 2000).
Our FIPA conform CA-AUML sequence
11 starts with an  inform-start-auction-protocol
performative indicating that initial information (e.g.  bidDensity,  bidderMaxLoad) is
                                                
7 FIPA: Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents http://fipa.org
8 JADE: Java Agent DEvelopment Toolset http://jade.cselt.it
9 FIPA ACL Message Structure Specification (Document number: XC00061E)
10 FIPA Interaction Protocol Library Specification (Document number: XC00025E)
11 Derived from the FIPA Dutch Auction Interaction Protocol Specification (Document number: XC00032F)Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
transmitted from the auctioneer-agent to the bidder-agents. In a second step cfp (call-for-
proposal) requests the participants to submit their bids. Bidders respond using the
performative  propose  to initiate bid transmission or not-understood  in case of
communication failure. In the last step of the CA-AUML sequence the auctioneer notifies the
agents about the acceptance or rejection of their bids after CA allocation is done.
Additionally ACL transmission requires the formulation of an ontology to define
communication content (e.g. communication predicate  submitBid has slot classes:  bids,
bundlePrice, bidderId). This was done using the Protégé 2000 ontology editor
12, which is
capable to produce ready for use JAVA-code.
6. Comparing the IG-CAA with the SA-CAA Performance
To evaluate the quality of our algorithms, we first calculated performance landscapes
13
(figures 7, 8) for the IG-CAA executing 20 simulation runs for each parameter constellation.
We allowed bidder agents to submit up to 10 bids per agent as a XOR-bid-bundle, meaning
that only one bid could be chosen by the auctioneer for CAP attribution. Additionally the
number of bidders participating in the CA was increased beginning with 5 bidders up to 100
bidders in steps of 5 agents. Maximum resource capacity load allowed for aggregate
allocation by the auctioneer has been set to 8 units, while R max has been set to 3 units. The
performance measure is simply the revenue achieved by the auctioneer after CAP allocation,
called income in our context. It is not surprising that fewer bidders and fewer bids per XOR
bundle cause lower income. Maximum income attained by the IG-CAA in the structured case
is about 400 Money Units (MU), whereas in the unstructured case an income of 500 MU is
reached for 100 bidders and 10 XOR bids per agent. Compared with the theoretically
reachable return of 24*8*4 = 786 MU this is satisfying average load-allocation in B2B and
B2C YM-terms. The performance difference between the IG-CAA using structured and
unstructured bids, does not astonish because the structured bids represent a higher challenge
for the auctioneer.
The comparison between IG-CAA and SA-CAA performance has been done without
calculating performance landscapes due to excessive calculation requirements. The SA-CAA
needs about four times more computation time than the IG-SAA, primarily caused by the
automatic annealing procedure described in 4.2. Instead of the whole landscape we calculated
four samples allowing 100 agents to submit 1 to 10 XOR bids. For each parameter setting we
performed 100 simulation runs. Despite the suggestion of a cooling factor a=0.8 in chapter
4.2 it turned out to be necessary to cool down the SA-system by  a=0.995 to lead to a
sufficient allocation quality in connection with a penalty-cost-factor of 0.5
14.
Expectedly the income progression of the IG-CAA has a steeper rise for the unstructured bids
leading to a final level of 450 MU (figure 9). Both curves start at about 320 MU which
indicates a weak impact of structure on the GR-CAA in connection with low bid densities.
For the SA-CAA the characteristic of the structured/unstructured discrimination is the same.
It shows a surprising performance collapse while allocating structured bids (figure 10). This
could only be explained with the strong parameter dependency of the SA-CAA which turned
out to be the main problem of this algorithm, making it a poor candidate for B2B and B2C
task and resource allocation applications.
                                                
12 http://protege.stanford.edu
13 Performance landscapes where done by using SPSS 10.0 in the scatter plot mode, calculating the performance plane with LLR-regression.
14 The starting temperature calculated by the Sundermann and Lemahieu (1995) procedure has a mean of 7000 using this parameter setting.Schwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
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Figure 7: Income of the IG-CAA using unstructured bids
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Figure 8: Income of the IG-CAA using structured bidsSchwind,Stockheim,Seibel                  Price Controlled Resource Allocation Information for Products and Services
Figure 9: Income for the GR-CAA employing a structured and an unstructured bid
               matrix
Figure 10: Income for the SA-CAA employing a structured and an unstructured bid   
                  matrix
7. Conclusion
Looking for a suitable approach to handle Resource and Task Allocation (RTA) problems in
a B2B and B2C infrastructure environment we decided to employ Combinatorial Auctions
(CA) as solution method. After having acquired a survey of common CA algorithms, an
Improved Greedy strategy based algorithm (IG-CAA) and a Simulated Annealing (SA)
founded approach (SA-CAA) have been designed. Simulations in a Multi Agent System
suggest that the IG-SAA seems to be more appropriate for industrial applications than the
SA-CAA. Despite the fact that the SA-CAA is providing feasible solutions at any time of
computation and yielding better allocations for unstructured CA bids, the IG-SAA seems to
2 4 6 8 10
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be more efficient in terms of computational effort. In our further work, we will try to examine
the properties of the SA-CAA more precisely by creating a thermodynamic landscape for
SA-parameter optimization. The design of iterated simultaneous CAs for price controlled
RTAs with integrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-mechanisms will be another topic of upcoming
research.
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